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Abstract  
         When government directs the economy, how does human welfare fare? This research 
narrows the scope of this question to explore the relationship between industrial policy and 
human development indicators through the context of China’s semiconductor industry and 
average income from employment from 1999-2019. While both the literature on industrial policy 
and China’s State Council’s guidelines suggest that the driving force behind semiconductor 
policy is the pursuit of economic growth, results suggest that the policies, as executed, bear 
limited significance to income increases over time. However, analysis does provide some key 
insights into the effectiveness of policy variations: 1) “national guidelines” accompanied by state 
investment vehicles are more effective than the just the publication of the former and 2) 
investment into historical Chinese industrial geographic clusters correlates to higher income 
increases as compared to new “upstart” semiconductor provinces. 
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Introduction 
In the past decade, the economic academia has experienced a reinvigoration of interest in 
industrial policy. Indeed, the rise of East Asia’s Tigers, most notably China (ranging from 6-14% 
annual GDP growth since 1999 in contrast to the US’ GDP growth ranging from -3% to 5% ), is 
difficult to miss (Chang & Andreoni, 2020). Although economists still heavily debate the “how” 
of industrial policy execution (Wade, 2009), The Economist jests that at least the field is in 
consensus that “one industry has been a big unintended beneficiary” of Chinese industrial policy: 
“the academic study of industrial policy.” In short, China has utilized industrial policy 
extensively for the purpose of economic growth, which makes it a good industrial policy case 
study (The Economist, 2020). 
This paper intends to contribute to the academia of industrial policy by studying the 
existing literature gap concerning industrial policy and its interactions with human development 
indicators by focusing specifically on average income from employment - a noted “aspect that 
has been neglected so far” (Barbieri et al., 2019). The particular nation selected for study is 
China and the particular industry selected is the semiconductor [also known as the integrated 
circuits (“IC”) and microchips] industry.  
Given the industry’s position as a key point of contention during the US-China Trade 
War that began in 2018 and a national security issue [in that it is crucial to the functioning of any 
electric device (Semiconductor Industry Association, 2021)], semiconductors are considered 
well-documented compared to other product “outputs” China’s National Bureau of Statistics 
provides public statistics for. Since 1956, China’s State Council (the central governing 
committee of China) has listed semiconductor research and industry advancement as a national 
priority. A variety of industrial policy tools, varying from VAT tax breaks, R&D subsidies, to 
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designated national champions strategies have been employed at the level of the central 
government and is clearly written in legislation. There are also noticeable periods in which 
China’s State Council’s semiconductor industrial policy has evolved, namely from: 1956-1990, 
1991-2004, 2005-2013, and 2014-Present (VerWey, 2019). These periods will be further 
discussed in the Background & Theory section.  
Furthermore, the development of the industry has been studied in the United States 
extensively and has been deemed a particularly effective “economic boon” to the economies it 
participates in (Jackson, 2020). Following this logic, studying the semiconductor industry is 
again more instructive compared to other industries subject to Chinese industrial policy for 
analysis of average income levels. 
There is another important motivation behind this research. Global demographics are 
changing. 70% of Millennials considered company values when making a consumer decision, 
compared to 51% of all online US adults (Lai, 2018). In the future, Millennials and Generation Z 
will become the architects of our institutions and will demand research related to the 
improvement of the human condition.   
For the empirical strategy, a two-step approach was used. First, analysis was run to verify 
two core assumptions that would fuel the second - the ultimate analysis of China’s 
semiconductor industrial policy and average annual income from employment.  
The first core assumption was to determine if income and semiconductor output in 
China’s provinces, taking into account control variables, were significant from 1999-2019. 
Results suggest a strong correlation.  
The second core assumption was that semiconductor industrial policy was significant to 
semiconductor output. At the national level of policy, a synthetic province analysis was used. For 
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regional levels of policy, a DID (difference-in-difference) analysis was performed on 
semiconductor output with treatment reflecting years of national significance for semiconductor 
industrial policy. Although the literature provides an abundance of semiconductor industrial 
policy research and analysis reflecting the success [measured simply in that China was able to 
manufacture 6% of the semiconductors it used in 2020 (Sheng, 2021) versus having zero 
capability a little over five decades ago], analysis that pinned specific policy periods to 
semiconductor output was not found. To ensure the robustness of the treatment periods used later 
in research for income levels, this paper thus provides the first DID analysis of China’s 
semiconductor output and policy to the author’s best knowledge.  
The core analysis used both a synthetic province analysis (again, at the national level of 
policy) and DID analysis (at the national and regional levels of policy) to determine average 
income from employment. Previous DID analysis available in the literature on China’s industries 
has been performed on household income and other income datasets to analyze healthcare and 
housing policies (Cao, 2015).  
Regressions of both assumptions and final analysis were necessary because to the 
knowledge of the author, similar analysis had not yet been conducted as of yet in the literature. 
All represent the first of their kind regarding the semiconductor and income question in 
literature.  
The analysis intends to contribute towards informing some of the most debated questions 
in the current circle of industrial policy academia: 
• What industrial policy tools make sense for what industries? Why? 
• What sectors make sense for what countries to subsidize? Why? 
• How should countries promote competition and innovation? (Stiglitz et al., 2013). 
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 While the insights of this paper can be used to inform the discourse, the author considers 
it necessary for the study to be broadened beyond the Chinese semiconductor industry before any 
insights intended to inform real world decisions is practically applied to any industry and 
country. No industry is exactly similar to the semiconductor industry and no country is identical 
to China… both are very unique, as discussed later under Background and Theory. Instead, the 
key motivating factor behind this discussion is to gain traction for the importance of the idea and 
enlarge the circle of scholarly debate around industrial policy’s effect on human development 
indicators. Human development itself is well-studied in the literature (ex. Lai’s 2013 principal 
component analysis of human development indicators in China). Where the difficulty (and 
correspondingly, the gap in literature) lies is determining the magnitude of effect of the many 
factors (ranging from policy to macroeconomic events) that affect the development of the human 
condition. The research question proposed in this paper deals solely with average income per 
capita level from employment. Other human development indicators, such as income inequality, 
wealth inequality, and adult literacy rates, remain to be explored. The success and sustainability 
of policy, especially in the high tech sector, relies as heavily on the development of human 
capital as it does on technological advancement. Neither should the scope of policy 
considerations be limited to “industrial policy”; it would be informative to evaluate the 
effectiveness of mechanisms such as patent policy or R&D contests as well. By developing this 
body of research, leaders of industry and government alike can make more informed decisions 
regarding high-tech industries that promise to be not only nation-changing, but world-changing. 
Examples of such use cases include quantum mechanics, artificial intelligence, robotics, and 
genetic research.  
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Literature Review 
 
An Introduction to Semiconductors 
Semiconductors, also commonly referred to as integrated circuits (“IC) or microchips, are 
crucial to the functioning of any electric device (Yinung, 2015). In 2019, the global 
semiconductor industry market size stood at USD $513.08B and is expected to grow at a 4.7% 
CAGR (Fortune, 2020). Barriers to entry for the industry are notoriously high given: 1) the 
immense cost of factories capable of manufacturing advanced semiconductors (high economies 
of scale) [costs can reach USD $12B for a single fabrication plant (Shih, 2020)], and 2) Moore’s 
Law which translates into significant first-mover and learning curve advantages. 
As a result, two main business models have become popular. First are behemoth firms 
that produce their semiconductors from start to finish. These are known as Integrated Device 
Manufacturers or IDMs. Second are firms that focus on specific sections of the value chain. The 
value chain is broken into three general sections: design; manufacturing; and assembly, test and 
packaging. In industry lingo, these activities are more commonly known as: fabless, foundries 
and ATP. China desires to promote all activity types with their semiconductor industrial policy 
to create a self-sufficient domestic supply chain (VerWey, 2019). 
 
The US Semiconductor Industry and History as Economic Boon 
Given the prevalence and demand of electronics, the semiconductor industry has gained 
government support globally as an economic boon and key issue of national security/defense. 
There exists extensive study of this phenomena in the US semiconductor industry. Research 
shows that in 2020, every $1 the US federal government invested in the semiconductor industry 
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represented a $16.50 increase to US GDP (SIA, 2020). Although the study did not further break 
down how national income was distributed at the individual or household level, The US Bureau 
of Labor Statistics estimates that the semiconductor industry adds jobs three times faster than the 
rest of the US economy, has an employment multiplier figure of 4.89 jobs to a US manufacturing 
average of 2.91, and commands average salaries $22,000 greater than the US average employee 
income (Toohey, 2016).  
Of note, the US is the birthplace of the semiconductor industry. In its nascent stage, the 
US semiconductor industry was supported by the US defense R&D budget. In the 60s and 70s, 
private capital poured in, resulting in the market landscape largely driven by market forces today 
(Platzer & Sargent, 2016). This contrasts greatly with China’s semiconductor industry, which has 
been nurtured almost purely through government coordination and industrial policy (Ezell, 
2021). 
 
An Introduction to Industrial Policy  
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace defines industrial policy as: “[A] 
government intervention in a specific sector which is designed to boost the growth prospects of 
that sector and to promote development of the wider economy.” (Dadash, 2020).  
Today, four economic realities of the 21st century have not only revived the discourse 
around industrial policy, but focused it on the question of execution. The first reality is the rise of 
East Asia’s Tigers (ex. Japan, South Korea, and China). Second, the unprecedented government 
intervention during the 2008 financial crisis through “emergency use of industrial-policy tools 
leads to demands for more” (The Economist, 2010). Third, globalization, particularly in “supply 
chain, financialization and new imperialism” has caused countries to question the distribution 
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and balance of their economies (Chang & Andreoni, 2020). Finally, “the weak state of the world 
economy” increases government pressure to reduce unemployment and stimulate growth (The 
Economist, 2010).  
On the question of execution, a current key point of contention is how governments can 
boost domestic innovation and productivity. A 2019 report by the Center for Strategic & 
International Studies notes that in the US, while “[s]ome orthodox economists dismiss calls for 
more active federal intervention in the economy as “wasteful industrial policy,” exceptional 
innovations such as GPS, supercomputing and satellites have been the result of sizeable military 
procurement and R&D budgets (Gerstel & Goodman, 2020). In the context of China’s 
semiconductor industrial policy, the debate is especially pronounced given the significant 
investment as mentioned prior necessary for China to play “catch-up”... and the existing 
probability that it never can. That said, a study published in the American Economics Journal: 
Macroeconomics showed that in China’s manufacturing industries, “subsidies and tax breaks as 
instruments of industrial policy improve firm performance in competitive sectors while loans and 
tariffs do not.” (Aghion et al., 2015). In short, an understanding and following of general 
industrial policy involving its design and governance is imperative to the global semiconductor 
industry at-large given the involvement of governments and the strong influences of 
globalization on the industry. 
On that note, the idea of differentiating between “horizontal” and “vertical” industrial 
policy is gaining prominence as an attempt to break down industrial policy. The International 
Institute for Sustainable Development defined the two in its 2019 Global Economic Governance 
Through the Lens of Inequality and Sustainable Development as: “The former traditionally 
referred to policies such as those involving science and innovation, which are meant to facilitate 
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industry growth and are relatively uncontroversial. The latter can involve tariffs on specific 
inputs, subsidies to particular sectors and concessional loans.” In simpler terms, vertical 
industrial policy is usually targeted at specific firms/narrow sectors while horizontal industrial 
policy is targeted towards “broad sectors by improving their business environments.” (Loayza, 
2017). Although there are circumstances where the line of distinction between the two are quite 
blurred, in the case of China’s semiconductor industrial policy, the majority of policy is vertical. 
Guidelines for semiconductor development written by the central government clearly targets 
semiconductor innovation rather than general innovation.  
Geographic industrial clustering is an industrial policy tool that features prominently in 
China. The concept of clusters was first introduced in 1990 by Michael Porter in his book, The 
Competitiveness of Nations. In more recent years, Porter and fellow luminaries have solidified 
the definition of clusters: “Clusters are geographic concentrations of industries related by 
knowledge, skills, inputs, demand, and/or other linkages.” (Delgado et al., 2014). The concept is 
important to this study because China has traditionally utilized geographic industrial clustering 
heavily in every sectoral policy, semiconductors included. Although it is recognized in the 
literature that clusters as an economic organization principle is “mostly [a] positive 
development” (Donahue et al., 2018), there are negatives as well. For instance, while Porter 
argues in a 2003 paper that clusters produce higher firm-level income and employment gains for 
the individual, a body of research has found exceptions to this relation. A comprehensive study 
of technology-based clusters in the Appalachian region of the United States found that: 
“clustering is associated with new business formation for selected technology industries but not 
with employment growth.” (Feser et al., 2008).  
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The Relationship between Industrial Policy and Income  
An important assumption to solidify before even embarking on impending analysis is to 
ascertain that industrial policy actually affects average income from employment levels. The 
literature suggests that not only can industrial policy affect average income, increasing average 
income should be a motivating factor to implement industrial policy. Industrial policy tools, 
varying from tariffs to IP regulations, have all proven to be “drivers [that] can increase labour 
productivity, economic development and social welfare.” (Kolesnik, 2016). In the determination 
of each of these factors, income levels are an important input. (Stone, 2017).  
For more specific direction, this study will refer to the research of Robert Wade, who has 
written extensively on the topic of how industrial policy can be utilized to help developing 
countries move into the higher income brackets typical of more developed countries. A 
discussion of this will be provided in the Theoretical Framework section below. 
 
China’s Semiconductor Industrial Policy 
Historically, China’s semiconductor industrial policy can be broken down into four time 
periods.  
The first time period begins in 1956, when the first transistor was created in a Chinese 
state-sponsored laboratory. The time period, which lasted till 1990, was characterized by state-
led innovation (for instance, R&D was carried out solely at university labs like Tsinghua funded 
by the central government) and the emergence of the Yangtze River Delta cluster. The second 
time period, from 1990-2002, was characterized by two central government projects (Project 908 
and 909) that were the first serious attempts to create a domestic IDM. By 2002, both projects 
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had been abandoned in favor of joint ventures with foreign firms such as Siemens and Intel 
(VerWey, 2019). 
A more in depth overview of the last two time periods, which is the focus of this 
research, is provided below. 
• 3rd Period: 2005 - 2014 
Focus: Rise of SMIC, Foreign Acquisition & Capitalizing on Growing Domestic Market 
The suspension of Project 909 was accompanied by the rise of the Semiconductor 
Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) in Beijing. A foundry company, SMIC 
successfully leveraged “a five-year tax holiday (and another five-year tax break at 50 percent of 
standard rates), tariff exemptions [on inputs], reduced value-added tax rates[, and] partnerships 
with foreign firms” to produce semiconductors only two years behind international leaders. 
Today, it is among the five largest foundry companies in the world (Lee, 2021). Encouraged by 
this success, China began pouring resources into acquisitions of foreign semiconductor 
companies and reverse engineering.  
Also of note is the 2005 investment vehicle that the State Council raised specifically to 
stimulate semiconductor production in Western provinces (which are considered less developed 
than their Eastern counterparts). Funds are allocated for both R&D and production purposes 
(PwC, 2005).  
• 4th Period: 2014 — Present 
Focus: State-led Creation of Closed-loop Manufacturing Ecosystem 
2014 marked a renewed effort on behalf of the central government to achieve 
semiconductor self-sufficiency. One notable exogenous event that spurred this desire was the 
Trade War waged between the Trump and Xi administrations. After the Trump administration 
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blacklisted a series of Chinese semiconductor companies (whether by banning US investment, 
prevention of acquisition of US companies or urging allies to cease buying), Chinese 
semiconductor producer ZTE nearly went bankrupt. This spurred China’s central government to 
list semiconductor technological and production “self-sufficiency” as a first priority in a new set 
of national guidelines published in 2015 called Made in China 2025 (Cheng, 2018). In 2019, 
semiconductors represented China’s greatest import at $160B and an export of $20B. (Horwitz, 
2018). This discrepancy due to semiconductors is China’s greatest trade deficit, greater than even 
the Chinese oil trade deficit. (Wübbeke et al., 2016). Figure 1 provides an illustration of 
semiconductor output by province form 1999, the earliest year China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics provides statistics for.  
 









2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Semiconductor Output, by Province (1999-2019)
  Beijing   Tianjin   Hebei   Shanxi   Inner Mongolia   Liaoning   Jilin
  Heilongjiang   Shanghai   Jiangsu   Zhejiang   Anhui   Fujian   Jiangxi
  Shandong   Henan   Hubei   Hunan   Guangdong   Guangxi   Hainan
  Chongqing   Sichuan   Guizhou   Yunnan   Tibet   Shaanxi   Gansu
  Qinghai   Ningxia   Xinjiang
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During the present period, China has been incorporating the lessons it has learned from 
previous time periods to produce very detailed national guidelines on how to produce a closed-
loop manufacturing ecosystem. The capital amounts dedicated towards achieving these goals are 
unprecedented, with USD $200B expected to be invested in the next decade. Three national 
plans now govern China’s semiconductor industrial policy: 1) “The Guidelines to Promote a 
National Integrated Circuit Industry,” 2) “Made in China 2025,” and 3) “The Made in China 
2025 Technical Area Roadmap” (VerWey, 2019).  
Semiconductors have become the foremost state priority, especially after the Trump 
administration used semiconductors as political leverage, as noted earlier, during the Trade War. 
The urgency felt by China’s central government is reflected in policy. The Semiconductor 
Industry Association summarizes: “Some of these policies have the potential to: (1) force the 
creation of market demand for China’s indigenous semiconductor products; (2) gradually restrict 
or block market access for foreign semiconductor products as competing domestic products 
emerge; (3) force the transfer of technology; and (4) grow non-market based domestic capacity, 
thereby disrupting the fabric of the global semiconductor value chain” (Goodrich, 2017). 
In contrast to the body of current industrial policy research that has de-emphasized the 
selection of “national champions” (Bianchi et al., 2006), the concept is taking center stage in 
China’s semiconductor policy. The main fault of the previous fragmentation of the industry (and 
previous policy) was the inability of domestic manufacturers to build up the capability to absorb 
technology spill-overs. As such, China is now focused on investing in national champions along 
each key step of the semiconductor supply chain (Orr et al., 2014). Although there is no official 
publication that details which companies have been designated national champions, a quick 
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cross-reference of company leader backgrounds and revenue (given the unique business 
environment in China where business success is almost predicated upon strong government 
support) gives reason to suspect certain firms have been designated national champions. A quick 
overview is given of these firms: 
·  Tsinghua Unigroup 
Tsinghua Unigroup, once an affiliate of Tsinghua University (where China’s first 
experiments with semiconductors began) is hailed as the “national champion of champions.” A 
state-owned enterprise (SOE), it is seen as China’s response to the likes of Intel and China’s 
greatest hope for a semiconductor company with an IDM business model. Largely the product of 
merger and acquisition sprees, it has a presence along the entire semiconductor supply chain. 
Notable domestic acquisitions include XMC, Speadtrum and RDA. Internationally, its attempted 
acquisitions of Micron Technologies and Powertech Mediateck were blocked by foreign 
governments in an attempt to prevent the transfer of valuable technology (Feng et al., 2018).  
·  SMIC 
SMIC is China’s national champion in foundry (chip manufacturing).  
·  HiSilicon 
HiSilicon is a subsidiary of Huawei and China’s chip design national champion. 
(The Economist, 2016). 
 However, perhaps what is most unprecedented about China’s semiconductor industrial 
policy in 2014 is the capital influx into the industry. First, a national semiconductor investment 
fund was created. Local provinces followed in the footsteps of the state government and created 
their own investment vehicles as well. More details about these vehicles are provided below in 
the Direct Subsidies section. Second, the central government created a new domestic stock 
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exchange platform focused on “hi-tech national champions” known as STAR. Semiconductor 
companies represented 17% of the newly-formed STAR exchange (Sheng, 2021). 
In regards to specific industrial policy tools, this study will focus on the usage of direct 
subsidies (specifically investment vehicles) and geographic industrial clustering. It should be 
noted, however, that foreign M&A and joint ventures with a focus on technology transfer are 
prominent tools in China’s industrial policy toolbox as well.  
 
Geographic Industrial Clustering 
Four semiconductor clusters lead the industry in China. Broadly, they are the: Yangtze 
River Delta, Pearl River Delta, Beijing-Tianjin Bohai Sea region and Central-Western region.  
The Yangtze River Delta represents not only the forefront and birthplace of 
semiconductor technology in China (with a focus on the midstream and downstream sections of 
the semiconductor supply chain), but the regions lead in revenue generation as well. In 2015, 
annual revenue reached 179.2B RMB (Trendforce, 2016). 
The Pearl River Delta is home to China’s equivalent of Silicon Valley - Shenzhen which 
is located in Guangdong province. Annual revenue from the region’s semiconductor industrial 
cluster reached 68.8B RMB in 2015. The region is also home to HiSense, a semiconductor 
national champion and subsidiary of Huawei (Trendforce, 2016). 
The Beijing-Tianjin Bohai Sea region is home to China’s two leading designated national 
champions: SMIC and Tsinghua Unigroup. Revenue from the cluster reached 62.5B RMB in 
2015 (Trendforce, 2016). 
Finally, the Hubei and Gansu provinces are the heart of the Central-Western region’s 
semiconductor production. Hubei, a newer entrant, has developed into China’s domestic NAND 
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flash (computer storage medium and type of semiconductor (Grupp et al., 2012)) epicenter. 
Annual revenue in the region reached 50.5B RMB in 2015. (Trendforce, 2016). IC development 
in Wuhan’s High-Tech Zone solidified around 2008 with XMC’s entry. (Xie et al., 2018). 
 
Direct Subsidies 
Direct subsidies primarily take the form of industry-specific tax breaks and investment 
vehicles. The latter will be the focus of this study.  
Over the next decade, China’s plans to invest over $200B USD into the semiconductor 
industry. At all levels of the government (ex. city, provincial, national), investment 
funds/vehicles specifically targeting semiconductor development have been established. The 
most notable fund is the aptly named National Integrated Circuit Investment Fund (“NICIF”) 
created in 2014 under the “National IC Plan” (formally the “Guidelines to Promote National 
Integrated Circuit Industry”). $21B and $29B were raised for the NICIF in 2014 and 2019 
respectively (Kubota, 2019). Research into the sources of the NICIF’s capital reveals significant 
participation from SOEs and financial institutions. (VerWey, 2019).  
Below the state, many provincial and local governments have their own semiconductor-
specific funds as well. For instance, Suzhou, a prefecture, recently established a 10B RMB 
semiconductor fund. (Ku, 2020). Figure 2 shows a breakdown of provinces with provincial funds 
and fund sizes. It is expected that these funds have invested similarly to the national fund, often 
in the same national champions. The key difference lies in the fact that the provincial funds 
specifically target semiconductor production within the province, as opposed to investments 
between provinces and with multiple provinces.  
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Figure 2: Provincial Semiconductor Fund Sizes (2014 Regional Policy) 
 
 
Human Development and Income in China 
The United Nations Development Program notes: “China’s Human Development Index 
(HDI) has increased from 0.410 in 1978 to 0.752 in 2017, and China is the only country that has 
leapt from the low human development group to the high human development group since HDI 
was measured globally by the United Nations Development Programme for the first time in 
1990.” Since then, 740M people have been lifted out of poverty (UNDP, 2019). China’s GDP 
enjoys some of the highest growth rates in the world (currently ~6%, 90.04 Trillion RMB in 
2018 (The World Bank, 2021)) and consumption in both rural and urban areas has increased 
substantially. The reforms that have made this transformation possible began as primarily 
economic in nature. Most notably, after the “Reform and Opening Up” under the administration 
of Deng Xiaoping, China’s fiscal system “changed from a ‘each eats his own meal’ (a system of 
dividing revenue and expenditure between the central and local governments) to a ‘tax-sharing 
system.’” After economic growth was achieved, the state government began focusing on 
equitable contributions of the nation’s wealth. This has led to an overall increase in income 
across the nation (UNDP, 2019). It is also important to differentiate between intensive and 
Provincial Semiconductor Fund Sizes (2014)
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extensive growth (Wilczynski, 1972). The population of China, due to the One-Child policy, has 
remained at a ~0.4% growth rate since the 2000s (The World Bank, 2020). The country has also 
not annexed additional territory. Thus, most of its economic growth can be attributed to the 
intensive variety.  
An illustration of provincial income from employment by year is provided in Figure 3. 
 















1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Average Income from Employment, by Province (1999-2019)
Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi Inner Mongolia
Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang Shanghai Jiangsu
Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Jiangxi Shandong
Henan Hubei Hunan Guangdong Guangxi
Hainan Chongqing Sichuan Guizhou Yunnan
Tibet Shaanxi Gansu Qinghai Ningxia
Xinjiang
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Theoretical Framework 
China has been focused on economic growth, with the government using the tools of 
industrial policy extensively to achieve this goal. In theory, this should translate into higher 
levels of income from employment as citizens become better off with economic expansion. To 
establish this connection, three insights from theory were borrowed. First, the proliferation of the 
semiconductor industry leads to increased income (at least in the US where market forces 
dominate). Second, China’s semiconductor industrial policy is well-designed, as defined by 
research of various case studies in literature. Finally, successful economic growth is 
accompanied by income growth. The first criteria has been discussed previously. The second will 
be discussed through the research of Robert Wade, an economist at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science and receiver of the Leontief Prize in Economics. The third will 
be discussed through the work of Jacob Mincer, a father of modern labor economics.  
 
Industrial Policy and Economic Growth 
 In his 2012 article titled “Industrial Policy in Response to the Middle-income Trap and 
the Third Wave of the Digital Revolution,” Wade discusses how “sectorally-target industrial 
policy can help to speed a middle-income country through the ‘glass ceiling’ and into the high-
income segment.” Although Wade discusses income at the level of the state instead of per capita, 
the tie between economic growth and a state moving from middle-income to high-income still 
holds. Wade conducts case studies of commonly accepted “successful” instances of industrial 
policy (ex. Japan’s electronics industry, Korea’s steel and semiconductor industry) and argues 
architectural components such as R&D investment and investing beyond comparative advantage 
spurs economic growth (Wade, 2019). Given Wade’s guidelines, it would seem that China’s 
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semiconductor industrial policy is well-designed. The literature consensus is also that China’s 
industrial policy in general, has helped spur the nation’s economic growth. This in itself could be 
a definition of success. 
 
Mincer’s Income/Wage Model 
Considering that the “Mincer earnings function is a cornerstone of a large literature in 
empirical economics” (Heckman et al., 2003), Mincer’s 1958 human capital earnings model 
[derived from the principles of compensating differences and shown below as Model (1)] serves 
as the guiding framework in this paper to discuss earnings.  
1.       ln[𝑤(𝑠, 𝑥)] =	∝!+ 𝜌"𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑥 + 𝛽#𝑥$ + 𝜀 
• 𝑠 = schooling level 
• 𝑥 = work experience 
• 𝑤(𝑠, 𝑥)	= wage at schooling level s and work experience x 
• 𝑠 = rate of return to schooling 
Two adjustments to Mincer’s model are made given the context of this paper. First, 
average income will be thought to have the same determining drivers as the average wage 
depicted by Mincer. It will also be assumed that work experience and age exhibit similar 
characteristics and are substitutable.  
Although an empirical analysis could not be found to verify whether these substitutions 
ensure the model remains significant, two studies found in the literature suggest these inputs are 
highly correlated. First, the Institute of Medicine (US) Committee on the Long-Run 
Macroeconomic Effects of the Aging U.S. Population published a report in 2012 noting: “As the 
workforce ages, it becomes more experienced.” In other words, age and work experience are 
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directly related. Second, Mincer developed a model for income determination in 1994 (Su & 
Heshmati, 2013), shown in Model (2) below:  
2.       ln(𝐼𝑁𝐶%) = 𝑋%𝛽 + 𝜀% 
• ln(𝐼𝑁𝐶%) = natural logarithm of the annual income for observation i 
• 𝑋%= a vector of individual characteristics including a measure of education, age, 
occupation, gender, marital status, child status, and household size  
Both education and age are inputs to individual income in this model.  
Unfortunately, given the limited availability of public data regarding the other vector 
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Hypotheses 
Upon completion of a literature review, the theory would suggest the following hypotheses:  
1. Semiconductor industrial policy in China should have a significant positive impact on 
human capital earnings, as represented by annual average income from employment by 
province. 






















The data used for the purpose of this study was scraped from 2 sources. From both 
sources, the data ranged from 1999-2019, represents year-end numbers, and was measured by 
province, unless otherwise stated.  
• National Bureau of Statistics China Statistical Yearbooks 1999-2019 
o Semiconductor output in 10,000 units  
• China National Database Stats Center 
o Average income from employment, in yuan (1999-2002) 
o Total population 
o Number of people with at least a college degree 
o Number of people between the ages of 15-64 (sampling fraction of 0.820%) 
• EPS China 
o Average income from employment, in yuan (2003-2019) 
Of the 31 provinces in China, 7 provinces have never produced any semiconductors from 
1999-2019. Based on 2019 regional GDP figures, the 24 Chinese provinces that have produced 
semiconductors represent ~94% of national GDP and ~92% of the national population. (National 
Bureau of Statistics China, 2020).  
A total of 3,912 instances of data were collected.  
 The demographic data originates from an annual national sample survey of population. 
2010 was the sole exception; census data was used that year instead.  
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Statistical Model & Variables 
As noted earlier, some preliminary analysis is necessary to affirm the assumptions that 
underlie the ultimate topic of study: the relationship between China’s semiconductor industrial 
policy and income.  
 
Semiconductor Models 
The first assumption is that semiconductor policy enacted in specific time periods has 
actually been significant to semiconductor output (as opposed to semiconductor output just 
growing consistently year by year). In short, if it is discovered that differences in semiconductor 
policy have no effect on overall semiconductor output, it would be dubious to take the next step 
and relate semiconductor policy time periods to income levels.  
Two empirical methods were used to study the differing (or absorbing) effects of national 
policy versus specific regional policy.  
A synthetic graphical analysis (where synthetic provinces were created to approximate 
the circumstance of provinces without policy enacted) was used to study national level policy in 
both 2005 and 2014.  
To study regional policies, a difference-in-difference analysis (“DID”) was determined 
suitable for the analysis because it allows a simple comparison between average income from 
employment and provinces that were treated and not treated. In 2005, the regional policy that 
deployed investment funds to Western semiconductor provinces was studied. In 2014, the 
regional policy of where local provinces raised their own semiconductor investment funds in 
conjunction to the national fund was studied.  
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Given the lack of data below the provincial level, it was determined that Chinese 
provinces that had no semiconductor output over the time period of 1999-2019 (and thus were 
not subject to semiconductor industrial policy) to be the most suitable counterfactuals. All 
Chinese provinces ultimately report to the central government and State Council, which is 
responsible for setting the guidelines and directing the bulk of China’s industrial policy 
ambitions. 
 
Semiconductor Synthetic Analysis 
 To create the synthetic provinces if 2005 policy did not occur, a CAGR was calculated 
using annual average provincial semiconductor output from 2001-2004. For the synthetic 
provinces if 2014 policy did not occur, a CAGR was calculated using the time range from 2001-
2013.  
 Besides semiconductor output, these calculations were performed on the control variables 
of education, age and population as well. Look to the appendix for an output of the control 
variables; in all synthetic cases, the control variables to do not vary substantially from reality. 
 
Semiconductor DID Analysis 
The base model is defined in (3) and its variations are discussed below:  
3. 𝑆% = 𝛼! + [𝛽#𝑇# + 𝛾#𝐷# + 𝛼#(𝑇# ∙ 𝐷#)] 
Average provincial semiconductor output in year i is represented by 𝑆% .		𝑇% , and	𝐷% are 
dummy variables. 	𝑇% is equal to 1 when provinces record an output of semiconductors in any 
year within the year range of the policy being analyzed. Otherwise, it is equal to 0. 	𝐷% is equal to 
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1 inclusive of the year the policy was enacted and afterwards. For the years before, 	𝐷% is equal to 
0. 
A total of 16 model variations were analyzed. Variations can be split into two main 
categories:  
• Control variables 
• Treatment periods, 𝑇% 
Control Variables 
Control variables were considered as an attempt to eliminate provincial demographic 
differences. Considerations were also made for the quality and availability of data. Education, 
age and population were selected. Model (4) represents the base Model (3) with the addition of 
the control variable variation.  
4. 𝑆% = 𝛼! + [𝛽#𝑇# + 𝛾#𝐷# + 𝛼#(𝑇# ∙ 𝐷#)] + 𝛼$𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛$ + 𝛼&𝑎𝑔𝑒& + 𝛼'𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' +
𝛼(𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛2002( + 𝛼)𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐹𝐶) + 𝜀% 
education is defined as the percentage of a province’s total population that holds at least a 
college degree. 
age is defined as the percentage of a province’s total population that is aged between 15-
64. This age range is typically considered the “workforce” proxy when studying Chinese labor 
economics (World Economic Forum).  
population is defined as the total population in a province. 
recessiondotcom is a dummy variable to account for the Dotcom bubble. It is 1 for 2001 
and 2002, and 0 from 2003-2019. 
recessionGFC is a dummy variable to account for the Great Financial Crisis. It is 1 for 
2007-2009, and 0 from 2001-2006 and 2010-2019. 
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Treatment periods, 𝑇* 
Treatment periods were determined based on an evaluation of literature and general 
research. The evaluation suggested that the consensus is that from 1999 to 2019, there are two 
significant periods of semiconductor policy changes, with 2005 and 2014 being pivotal years. 
Furthermore, considering the high upfront costs and time it takes to spur semiconductor 
production (McKinsey, 2011), it would be appropriate to consider the data for lag in policy. To 
account for all these possibilities, each of these time periods were first analyzed in isolation as a 
single treatment to the data. Model (3) was then analyzed through iterations with 𝑇* representing 
different post treatments (inclusive of policy implementation year) of 2005, 2006, 2014 and 
2015.  
However, the reality of China’s semiconductor industrial policy from 2001-2019 is that it 
was separated into two general periods. To understand the true impact of individual policy 
periods without diluting the analysis with the impact of later policy periods, a variation on the 
simple DID model given in Model (3) was introduced. Model (5) accounts for two treatment 
periods. Model (6) represents the addition of the control variable variation noted in the previous 
section. 
5. 𝑆% = 𝛼! + [𝛽#𝑇# + 𝛾#𝐷# + 𝛼#(𝑇# ∙ 𝐷#)] 	+ [𝛽$𝑇$ + 𝛾$𝐷$ + 𝛼$(𝑇$ ∙ 𝐷$)] + 𝜀% 
6. 𝑆% = 𝛼! + [𝛽#𝑇# + 𝛾#𝐷# + 𝛼#(𝑇# ∙ 𝐷#)] 	+ [𝛽$𝑇$ + 𝛾$𝐷$ + 𝛼$(𝑇$ ∙ 𝐷$)] +
𝛼&𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛& + 𝛼'𝑎𝑔𝑒' + 𝛼(𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛( + 𝛼)𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛2002) + 𝛼+𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐹𝐶+ + 𝜀%  
Using the same reasoning described earlier regarding the controversy surrounding the 
true beginning of the first policy period and lag periods, the following model variations on time 
period were studied (𝑇#, 𝑇$): (2005-2013, 2014-2019); (2006-2014, 2015-2019). 
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Income OLS Model 
The second assumption is less of an assumption rather than a motivating factor. To test 
whether average provincial semiconductor output produced over 1999-2019 was even correlated 
with average provincial income from employment, a simple ordinary least squares (“OLS”) 
regression was used. Income was the dependent variable and semiconductor output was the 
independent variable. Models (7) and (8) represent magnitudes/levels. Models (9) and (10) 
measures changes (delta) in variables. Models (8) and (10) represent variations with the addition 
of control variables.  
7. 𝑌% = 𝑎! + 𝛽#𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟# + 𝜀% 
8. 𝑌% = 𝑎! + 𝛽#𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟# + 𝛽$𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛$ + 𝛽&𝑎𝑔𝑒& + 𝛽'𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' +
𝛽(𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚( + 𝛽)𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐹𝐶) + 𝜀% 
9. ∆𝑌% = 𝑎! + 𝛽#∆𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟# + 𝜀% 
10. ∆𝑌% = 𝑎! + 𝛽#∆𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟# + 𝛽$∆𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛$ + 𝛽&∆𝑎𝑔𝑒& + 𝛽'∆𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' +




Income Synthetic Analysis 
Similar logic was followed here to create the synthetic provinces as earlier in the 
semiconductor output analysis to study national policy. The only difference is the calculation of 
CAGR. 2005 synthetic provinces were projected from a 1999-2004 CAGR and 2014 synthetic 
provinces were projected from a 1999-2013 CAGR.  
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Income DID Models 
In addition to the DID model variations studying semiconductor output, the DID models 
studying income introduce one more variation: the scope of policy (regional or national). Since 
China’s semiconductor industrial policy at the national scope is applied to every province, every 
province in China should technically be considered “treated.” However, practically, that leaves 
little room for analytical insight. Thus, for the purpose of this study, semiconductor output was 
used as a proxy to determine whether a province had experienced the effects of policy when 
studying the effects of national policy. The logic is that if funds were distributed specifically for 
semiconductor production, it would only be logical that those provinces that produced 
semiconductors received funds.  
To study the regional policies (the 2005 Western province investment vehicle and 2014 
provincial funds), the same approach was used as with the earlier semiconductor DID models.  
The approach taken to analyze semiconductor industrial policy in China at the provincial 
level with average income from employment is informed by the previous two models.  
11. 𝑌% = 𝛼! + [𝛽#𝑇# + 𝛾#𝐷# + 𝛼#(𝑇# ∙ 𝐷#)] + 𝜀% 
12. 𝑌% = 𝛼! + [𝛽#𝑇# + 𝛾#𝐷# + 𝛼#(𝑇# ∙ 𝐷#)] + 𝛼$𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛$ + 𝛼&𝑎𝑔𝑒& + 𝛼'𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' +
𝛼(𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛2002( + 𝛼)𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐹𝐶) + 𝜀% 
13. 𝑌% = 𝛼! + [𝛽#𝑇# + 𝛾#𝐷# + 𝛼#(𝑇# ∙ 𝐷#)] + [𝛽$𝑇$ + 𝛾$𝐷$ + 𝛼$(𝑇$ ∙ 𝐷$)] +	𝜀% 
14. 𝑌% = 𝛼! + [𝛽#𝑇# + 𝛾#𝐷# + 𝛼#(𝑇# ∙ 𝐷#)] + [𝛽$𝑇$ + 𝛾$𝐷$ + 𝛼$(𝑇$ ∙ 𝐷$)] +
𝛼&𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛& + 𝛼'𝑎𝑔𝑒' + 𝛼(𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛( + 𝛼)𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛2002) + 𝛼+𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐹𝐶+ + 𝜀% 
Model (11) is the base DID equation where average income from employment is the 
dependent variable. Model (11) and (12) represent a single treatment period while Model (13) 
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and (14) adjust for two treatment periods. Model (12) and (14) are the variations with the 
inclusion of control variables. In the exact fashion to Models (3-6), Models (11-14) were 
analyzed for varying treatment periods and datasets. Refer to the Semiconductor DID Models 
section above for the reasoning behind these model variations, designated treatment periods, and 
datasets.  
A key difference in concept between the Semiconductor DID Models and the Income 
DID Model is in the selection of control variables. While the control variables for both are the 
same, the intent behind the inclusion of education, age and population here is due to theory in the 
literature that these factors are determinants of income (refer to Mincer’s model discussed under 
Theoretical Framework) as opposed to controlling for provincial differences.  
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2005 - National Medium- and Long-Term Science and 
Technology Development Plan Outline (National)
Number of provinces 31 8 23 31 8 23
Number of observations 651 168 483 651 168 483
Average Income from Employment (in thousands) 7.52 8.04 6.80 87.65 92.21 81.34
std dev 2.10 2.36 1.49 22.15 26.35 12.96
Education 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.16 0.12
std dev 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.03
Age 0.68 0.69 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.71
std dev 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03
Population (in millions) 39.77 46.40 30.59 45.29 53.15 34.40
std dev 25.83 24.08 26.25 29.12 28.17 27.84
2014 - Guidelines for the Development and Promotion of 
the Integrated Circuit Industry (National)
Number of provinces 31 14 17 31 14 17
Number of observations 651 294 357 651 294 357
Average Income from Employment (in thousands) 7.52 7.79 6.89 87.65 90.10 82.51
std dev 2.10 2.29 1.50 22.15 24.98 14.30
Education 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.16 0.13
std dev 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.03
Age 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.71 0.71 0.71
std dev 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03
Population (in millions) 39.77 45.76 32.50 45.29 52.73 29.65
std dev 25.83 22.60 23.39 29.12 26.68 29.06
2005 - Western Province Semiconductor Investment Fund 
Policy (Provincial)
Number of provinces 31 18 13 31 18 13
Number of observations 651 378 273 651 378 273
Average Income from Employment (in thousands) 7.52 6.54 7.86 87.65 80.67 90.08
std dev 2.10 0.56 2.34 22.15 5.09 25.23
Education 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.12 0.16
std dev 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.09
Age 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.71 0.70 0.72
std dev 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04
Population (in millions) 39.77 47.35 37.13 45.29 49.19 43.93
std dev 25.83 20.40 27.37 29.12 20.04 31.96
2014 - Provincial Investment Vehicles Policy (Provincial)
Number of provinces 31 21 10 31 21 10
Number of observations 651 441 210 651 441 210
Average Income from Employment (in thousands) 7.52 8.28 6.89 87.65 95.48 81.21
std dev 2.10 2.51 1.50 22.15 28.49 12.74
Education 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.18 0.12
std dev 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.03
Age 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.71 0.72 0.71
std dev 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03
Population (in millions) 39.77 48.59 32.50 45.29 56.23 36.28
std dev 25.83 26.71 23.39 29.12 30.74 25.14
Notes:
Education = % of population (in province) with a college degree by province per year
Age = % of population (in province) that are working age (15-64) by province per year
Population = # of people 15-64 per province by year
Specific Regional Policy Descriptions
2005 - End of national VAT tax subsidy for domestic semiconductor firms after WTO dispute, new state-level investment vehicle 
targeting Western province tech raised
2014 - Local provinces formed provincial semiconductor-specific funds
1999 2019
Table 1.  Summary Statistics of Key Variables, 1999-2019
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Results 
Below are the key insights of this study on the topic of China’s semiconductor industrial 
policy and its relation to average annual income from employment.  
• Semiconductor industrial policy has not been significant on average income from 
employment levels in China.  
• In some cases, data shows a negative correlation (not significant, but large magnitude) 
between semiconductor industrial policy and income. 
• Synthetic graphical analysis shows income has been increasing in growth rates significantly 
in 2005 and 2014 – suggests that there are other factors more determinant than 
semiconductor industrial policy. 
• 2014 (national and regional) policy was the most significant to semiconductor output, but 
that significance was lost on income. 
• 2014 local provincial investment vehicles in existing geographic cluster seem to have a more 
positive impact/correlation on income compared to the 2005 western province development 
IC investment vehicle. 
 
In this section, figures and tables are organized according to their purpose/argument. A more 
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Assumption 1: Semiconductor output and average income from employment are 
positively correlated.  
 




Model # A B C D
Dependent variables
Independent variables
(1) Semiconductor 0 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 ***
std error 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2) Education1 3.02 *** 0.52
std error 0.13 0.31
(3) Age1 -2.00 *** -0.01
std error 0.22 0.42
(4) Population 0.01 35.02
std error 0.26 21.06
(5) Recession (dotcom) -22.85 ***
std error 2.25
(6) Recession (GFC) -8.53 ***
std error 1.86
Intercept2 37.03 *** 159.90 *** 2.17 *** 1.33 *
std error 1.09 15.56 0.32 0.52
Notes:
Timeframe: 1999-2019
Dataset: All 31 provinces of China
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Semiconductor = # of semiconductors produced per year by province
Education = % of population (in province) with a college degree by province per year
Age = % of population (in province) that are working age (15-64) by province per year
Population = # of people per province by year
Model Descriptions:
A income ~ semiconductors
B income ~ semiconductors educaton + age + population + recessiondotcom + recessionGFC
C incomedelta ~ semidelta
D incomedelta ~ semidelta + educatondelta + agedelta + populationdelta
1 in 100,000
2 in 1,000
Table 2.  Determinants of Income and ∆ Income 
Income Income ∆ Income ∆ Income
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Assumption 2: Semiconductor industrial policy in China is significant to semiconductor 
output.  
 

























































































Annual Average Provincial Semiconductor Output 1999-2019






1999 5250 5250 5250
2005 69079 69079 69079
2014 282304 196886 287135
2019 581555 264750 383681
CAGR (1999-2019) 60% 48% 54%
CAGR (2005-2019) 16% 10% 13%
CAGR (2014-2019) 16% 6% 6%
Annual Average Provincial Semiconductor Output
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Table 3: Impact of Regional Semiconductor Policy on Semiconductor Output with a Single 














(1) -0.94 -0.94 3.82 *** 3.92 ***
1.44 1.33 1.05 1.11
(2) -0.49 -0.51 3.19 ** 3.32 **
1.32 1.22 1.02 1.07
Notes:
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Model Descriptions
1 semiconductors ~ treat + period + treatperiod
2 semiconductors ~ treat + period + treatperiod + education + age + population + recessiondotcom
 + recessionGFC
Education = % of population (in province) with a college degree by province per year
Age = % of population (in province) that are working age (15-64) by province per year
Population = # of people per province by year
Specific Regional Policy Descriptions
2005 - End of national VAT tax subsidy for domestic semiconductor firms after WTO dispute, new state-level
 investment vehicle targeting Western province tech raised
2014 - Local provinces formed provincial semiconductor-specific funds
2005 2006 2014 2015
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Table 4: Impact of Regional Semiconductor Policy on Semiconductor Output with a 












Treat period 1 0.33 0.04
st error 1.11 1.11
Treat period 2 3.86 *** 3.93 ***
st error 1.05 1.11
Model (2)
Treat period 1 0.37 0.12
st error 1.08 1.07
Treat period 2 3.25 ** 3.34 **
st error 1.03 1.08
Notes:
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Model Descriptions
1 semiconductors ~ treat1 + period1 + treatperiod1 + treat2 + period2 + treatperiod2
2 semiconductors ~ treat1 + period1 + treatperiod1 + treat2 + period2 + treatperiod2 + education + age 
+ population + recessiondotcom + recessionGFC
Education = % of population (in province) with a college degree by province per year
Age = % of population (in province) that are working age (15-64) by province per year
Population = # of people per province by year
Specific Regional Policy Descriptions
2005 - End of national VAT tax subsidy for domestic semiconductor firms after WTO dispute, new state-level investment vehicle 
targeting Western province tech raised
2014 - Local provinces formed provincial semiconductor-specific funds
Table 4. Impact of Regional Semiconductor Policy on Semiconductor Output with a Double Treatment Period (DID)
2005-2013 2006-2014
2014-2019 2015-2019
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Income Analysis 
 
Figure 6: Synthetic Analysis of Annual Average Provincial Income from Employment 
 








1999 7530 7530 7530
2005 16241 16241 16241
2014 55339 37702 53665
2019 87778 48394 68082
CAGR (1999-2019) 13% 10% 12%
CAGR (2005-2019) 13% 8% 11%
CAGR (2014-2019) 10% 5% 5%
Annual Average Provincial Income from Employment
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Average Income of 2014 National 
Policy Treated and Untreated 
Provinces
Treated Untreated
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Table 5: Impact of National and Regional Semiconductor Policy on Average Annual 














DID estimator of National and Regional Semiconductor Industrial Policy on Annual Income from 
Employment w/ Single Treatment Period
Treatment Year
Policy National Regional National Regional National Regional National Regional
Model 
(1) -0.76 -3.56 -0.66 -3.28 -0.36 1.31 0.80 1.08
st error 6.66 2.74 5.70 2.38 4.50 2.16 3.89 2.38
(2) -2.87 -1.92 -2.91 -1.78 2.09 1.96 2.88 1.88
st error 2.43 2.42 2.09 2.08 2.05 1.89 2.28 2.10
Notes:
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Model Descriptions
1 income ~ treat + period + treatperiod
2 income ~ treat + period + treatperiod + education + age + population + recessiondotcom + recessionGFC
Education = % of population (in province) with a college degree by province per year
Age = % of population (in province) that are working age (15-64) by province per year
Population = # of people per province by year
20062005 2014 2015
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Table 6: Impact of National and Regional Semiconductor Policy on Average Annual 









DID estimator of National and Regional Semiconductor Industrial Policy on Annual




Treat period 1 -1.16       -0.99       -1.28 -1.30
st error 1.70 1.73 1.55 1.60
Treat period 2 1.32 2.68 2.06 3.09
st error 1.94 1.64 1.86 1.61
Notes:
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Model Description
income ~ treat1 + period1 + treatperiod1 + treat2 + period2 + treatperiod2 + education + age + population
Education = % of population (in province) with a college degree by province per year
Age = % of population (in province) that are working age (15-64) by province per year
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Discussion 
Assumption 1 
According to the OLS regression of both annual average income from employment levels 
and change in those levels, semiconductor output is significant with or without control variables. 
In the models with control variables, the signs of control variables coefficients align with what is 
expected as informed by Mincer’s models. Education, or a more highly educated population 
positively impacts income. Age is negative here, but this can be due to a supply and demand 
effect of labor. For instance, if the percentage of the population that is able-bodied has grown but 
the number of jobs has not kept up in pace, income levels would deflate. The lack of specific age 
data regarding the aging of the population is a limitation of this study.  
The recession variable coefficients are both negative, which matches the nature of an 
economic recession.  
Of note, semiconductor output is the only significant variable in the delta income model. 
This brings even more motivation to the study as delta is more robust of a test (taking into 
account direction and magnitude as opposed to just magnitude for income levels). A graphic 
illustration of Table 2 is provided in the appendix.  
 
Assumption 2  
Semiconductor industrial policy in China is significant to semiconductor output.  
 The synthetic graph shows that the highest CAGRs achieved are all in reality (60%) 
versus the CAGRs of the synthetic provinces (48% for pre-2005 policy and 54% for pre-2014 
policy). In other words, in both 2005 and 2014, semiconductor output experienced an inflection 
point, accelerating growth above its run rate. Of note, 2014 and 2005 seem to have had a similar 
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degree of impact on semiconductor output. The difference between 1999-2019 CAGRs is 6% 
between both reality and 2014 synthetic provinces, and 2014 synthetic provinces and 2005 
synthetic provinces. The 2005-2019 CAGRs show an even difference of 3% between the above 
sets as well.  
 DID regressions, as represented by Table 3 and 4, show similar effects. 2014 seems to be 
the most impact year. However, because the methodology of a DID allows to control for 
semiconductor policy, it is possible to correlate/attribute this significance more specifically to 
semiconductor industrial policy than with the previous synthetic analysis. Furthermore, we see 
the regression suggests a lag period in policy (2015 is as significant as 2014), which makes sense 
given the heavy capex and initial costs of ramping up semiconductor production. While the 
coefficients of the DID estimator for 2014 and 2015 range from 3-4, the 2015 DID estimator is 
always greater than the 2014 DID, suggesting 2015 is more impactful to semiconductor output 
determination. However, all 2015 standard errors are also greater than all 2014 standard errors, 
suggesting greater volatility in impact as well. Put in context, this could be due to the fact that 
the funds raised by local provinces in 2014 vary widely in size – from 200M to 50B RMB. The 
difference in fund size probably has some relation to overall impact of semiconductor output, 
and that difference would become more obvious over time.  
However, perhaps what is most intriguing about the regression is the negative coefficient 
for 2005 and 2006 regional policy when a single treatment period is used. Notably, the 
coefficient becomes positive with a double treatment period. While a double treatment period is 
more reflective of reality, any negative impact of semiconductor industrial policy on 
semiconductor output is still surprising. One possible explanation is that 2005 was the peak of a 
semiconductor cycle. As a capex intensive industry, semiconductor cycles are driven by 
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inventory buildup and global GDP stagnation. Cycles generally range 5-10 years, and the next 
major semiconductor dip was during the Great Financial Crisis, which was accounted for with a 
dummy variable (Regions, 2019). Another explanation is that the Western provinces had a 
volatile experience with semiconductor production. The double treatment period would suggest 
that funds drove positive production from 2005-2013 and the negative coefficient of the single 
treatment period suggests that growth stagnated after 2013.  
All in all, overall semiconductor output in China as depicted in the graph of output has 
never experienced negative growth (except for a stagnation period during the Great Financial 
Crisis). Given that the industry is largely directed and controlled by the State Council, this itself 
suggests that industrial policy has been successful to some degree in growing the industry. 
 
Income Analysis  
Semiconductor industrial policy has not been significant on average income from 
employment levels in China.  
The synthetic province analysis graph shows similar trends to the previous synthetic 
province analysis of semiconductor output. As before, the CAGRs for reality were higher than 
the 2005 and 2014 synthetic provinces. However, with income, the 1% difference between 
reality and the 2014 synthetic provinces’ CAGR and the 2% difference between the 2014 
synthetic provinces’ and 2005 synthetic provinces’ CAGR suggests that whatever occurred in 
2005 had a greater impact on income growth rate than 2014 did. However, both the synthetic and 
DID analysis of semiconductor policy to output would suggest that the opposite should be 
observed in income. There are a few reasons why this could be. It is important first though, to 
consider income in context. As Mincer’s models inform us, there are many determinants of 
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income and each of those determinants (ex. education) is influenced by its own set of 
determinants. Pinpointing income causality to semiconductor policy would be inaccurate in this 
synthetic province analysis. The only viable conclusion that can be determined is that the 
conglomerated effects of 2005 led to an increase in income growth higher than those of 2014. 
This is evident in overall national GDP growth in those years as well. GDP in 2005 grew by 
11.4% versus 7.6% in 2014 (The World Bank, 2021). The early 2000s represented the peak of 
China’s economic growth as the country underwent economic reform and benefited from global 
trade tailwinds after its inclusion into the World Trade Organization in December 2001 (UNDP, 
2019). Another explanation originates from Wade’s case studies of successful industrial policy. 
Wade notes that often, successful industrial policy results from investing beyond a developing 
country’s comparative advantages. For instance, pre-1980, South Korea did not have a steel 
industry to speak of. However, the government directed investments into growing the industry, 
and now the country has a thriving steel industry. The investments in 2005 were targeted at 
semiconductor provinces that were considerably less developed than their Eastern, coastal 
counterparts. However, as discussed later, a DID regression on income seems to suggest the 
exact opposite. Given that a DID regression allows for more control for semiconductor policy 
specificity, it should be inferred that most of impacts to income being observed are from macro-
level events whose effects far outweigh singular instances of semiconductor policy in 2005 and 
2014.  
The DID regressions show a lack of significance between semiconductor industrial policy 
and average annual income from employment.  
Before entering into a discussion of the DID results, it is instructive to establish some of 
the necessary assumptions that make DID a solid methodology. First, parallel trends. Although 
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treated and untreated provinces, as shown in the below figure, are not completely parallel pre and 
post-2014, a gradual divergence can be observed. Interestingly, treated and untreated provinces, 
as defined by 2014 policy, seem to have been affected by policy in 2005 quite significantly. This 
can be seen by the inflection point found in 2005 that both the treated and untreated province 
trendlines depict. A possible explanation for this phenomena is cause for further research.  
Another assumption of DID is that intervention is unrelated to outcome at baseline. 
However, when studying national policy DID, semiconductor output was used as a proxy for 
provinces considered treated or control. Since there was no way to trace the funds distributed at 
the national level of policy or pinpoint what national guidelines were used in which provinces, 
the next-best alternative was to make the assumption that if the goal of semiconductor industrial 
policy is to increase semiconductor output, then those provinces with semiconductor output 
should be the “receivers” of semiconductor policy. Regional policy DID, however, does fully 
fulfill this assumption. 
In short, the results of the DID in this study do not appropriately fulfill all the 
requirements in order to assume causality. Instead, given the steps used to remedy these 
shortcoming, whether by using two different empirical methods or varying the design of the DID 
models, this paper seeks to establish a strong correlation which may in the future, with the 
appropriate data, suggest a causation effect.  
The first intriguing point to the regressions is the negative DID estimator coefficient for 
both national and regional policy in 2005 and 2006. National policy in both years is defined by 
semiconductor output, while regional policy is defined as Western provinces that received funds 
from the 2005 semiconductor investment vehicle. Recessions are ruled out given that their 
effects should have been negated by the presence of dummy variables for the dot-com bubble 
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and the 2008 Great Financial Crisis. Earlier DID analysis of semiconductor output showed 
positive coefficients for the DID estimator for 2005 and 2006, even at albeit smaller magnitudes. 
Furthermore, national policy, in the case of 2005 and 2006 and accounting for control variables, 
seems to have a less negative impact (~ -1.9) as compared to regional 2005 and 2006 policy (~ -
2.9). Meanwhile, 2014 and 2015 have the opposite effect, where regional policy (1.31 and 1.08) 
is more positively impactful to income as compared to national policy (-0.36 and 0.8). There are 
a few possible explanations for why all this is happening.  
First, for 2004 and 2005, it is possible that the regional policy, which was targeted at 
underdeveloped Western provinces, consisted of more investments in R&D investment rather 
than production investment. However, R&D investment does not naturally translate into 
depressed levels of income – instead, it would help explain the insignificance of impact. A more 
probable explanation is the fact that China’s labor force was experiencing a massive oversupply 
in unskilled labor (Hsu, 2015). Considering that most of the R&D surrounding the 
semiconductor industry is located in the East and the West is home to semiconductor 
manufacturing, low-paying factory jobs may have dropped in salary, with other manufacturing 
industries following suit.  
Second, for 2014 and 2015, regional policy was defined as provincial investment 
vehicles. The provinces that raised funds tended to be the top semiconductor producers. These 
regions have not only historically been considered semiconductor geographic clusters (ex. 
Shanghai, Wuxi and Suzhou) but they are some of the highest income provinces in China. In 
contrast to the underdeveloped provinces targeted in 2004 and 2005, the data suggests that 
semiconductor industrial policy has greater effects on income in provinces that are already 
comparatively high-tech and wealthy. It is possible that only in such provinces is there the talent 
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(top universities and their graduates are attracted to these areas) and existing infrastructure to 
truly absorb the spillover effects of a booming semiconductor industry and continue to 
organically sustain the industry profitably. These considerations help explain the different in 
coefficient magnitude between the regional and national policy scopes.  
Also noteworthy is that while the difference in coefficients is approximately one turn 
(~1.0) between regional and national policy in 2004, 2005 and 2015, the difference is only ~.1 in 
2014. One explanation is the existence of a lag period. Earlier in the semiconductor DID, a lag 
period was noted. It is logical to assume that if the lag period appears in the semiconductor 
output DID, an even longer lag period would appear in the income DID given that the logical 
progression of a spillover effect is: 1) policy is enacted, 2) products are produced, and 3) as more 
products are produced, the industrial cluster grows and the state of human welfare should change 
as a result. Over time, step 2 and step 3 form a virtuous (or vicious) cycle, but this would also 
complicate the analysis in a way which the current methods would not suffice. It could be a 
potential direction for further research.   
Additionally, regional policy during 2014 and 2015 experiences a higher coefficient than 
during the single treatment period. The may suggest the existence of a compounding effect, 
where the existence of 2005 policy helped enable even greater success for 2014 policy. One 
possible explanation is the strategy China has taken with their industrial policy in the current 
period. The focus is on experimental trial-and-error, where the central government serves as the 
conduit of information. In other words, previous errors are internalized and applied in successive 
policy to more success. 
The last point the author would like to address is the lack of significance between income 
and semiconductor industrial policy. A few explanations come to mind. First, 2014 was a pivotal 
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year for China’s industrial policy. The current leader of the Communist Party in China, President 
Xi JinPing, transitioned into power after President Hu JinTao in late 2013. Xi promised reform 
and continued economic growth, leading to a flurry of not only industrial policy targeting 10+ 
“key sectors,” but economic and foreign policy reform legislation as well in 2014. (Look to the 
appendix for a list of some of these policies). It would be remiss to assume that semiconductor 
industrial policy would eclipse the effects of the sum of the other policies. However, at the same 
time, it should also be noted that even among all the industrial policy enacted in 2014, 
semiconductor industrial policy took center stage. Xi emphasized the importance of becoming 
domestically self-sustaining. The domestic semiconductor industry received the formation of a 
national investment vehicle and a significant share of the STAR stock exchange.  
Another possible explanation for lack of significance, especially among the provinces 
that raised semiconductor investment vehicles in 2014 is that the funds were a transferal of funds 
from one hi-tech sector to another, resulting in an indistinguishable difference to income levels.  
Finally, as a check for model quality, the control variable coefficients were all 
positive/negative in alignment to the original OLS model. A screenshot of a sample regression 












• The accuracy of the data used in this study is of concern because the majority was 
sourced from a Chinese government institution. In the literature, there are many accuracy 
critiques of China’s publicly available data (ex. the widely speculated inflation of China’s 
reported GDP). (Chen et al., 2019). However, given the lack of an alternative, and that 
there should be no egregious deviations, the author choose to stick with the current data 
source.  
• As mentioned earlier, China is a prolific in regards to industrial policy. Furthermore, it is 
a massive country with a massive population [accounting for 17.9% of the world’s 
population (WorldBank, 2020)]. Thus, it is difficult to establish causality. How does one 
go about distilling through the flurry of policy? Of exogenous factors? The various, 
complex interplay of policies? Without more precise data and knowledge of the exact 
nature of regulation, it is difficult to deem causality.  
• Another simplification made in this research is assuming in DIDs with double treatment 
periods and even in synthetic analysis that the funds and correlated policies ended 
precisely in the year in which the treatment period ended. This is probably not 
representative of reality.  Furthermore, there is no public data regarding the exact 
disbursement of funds.  
 
Future Research 
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There are many avenues worthy of further research to expand the literature on the 
relationship between industrial policy and human development. A more comprehensive study 
consisting of several industries and other human development indicators could provide insight 
into the commonalities of industries or specific industrial policy tools that are more adept at 
promoting certain indicators. The same can be done by studying one industry but various 
countries. Although there is difficulty in that direction in that countries themselves vary 
substantially from how their governments operate to the maturity of their industries, a potential 
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Appendix 


















education 1999 3% 3% 3%
2005 6% 6% 6%
2014 12% 12% 12%
2019 15% 15% 15%
age 1999 68% 68% 68%
2005 72% 72% 72%
2014 74% 78% 75%
2019 71% 81% 77%
population 1999 3979 3979 3979
2005 4151 4151 4151
2014 4400 4452 4403
2019 4532 4629 4537
Synthetic Province Control Variable Output
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Provincial Average Income from Employment OLS
Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi
Inner Mongolia Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang
Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui
Fujian Jiangxi Shandong Henan
Hubei Hunan Guangdong Guangxi
Hainan Chongqing Sichuan Guizhou
Yunnan Tibet Shaanxi Gansu
Qinghai Ningxia Xinjiang
Grace Wang 55 










lm(formula = income ~ treat3 + period3 + treatperiod3 + treat4 + 
    period4 + treatperiod4 + education + age + population + recessiondotcom + 
    recessionGFC, data = firstrial)
Residuals:
   Min     1Q Median     3Q    Max 
-33267  -4417   -168   3951  53679 
Coefficients:
                  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)      5.581e+04  1.004e+04   5.557 4.03e-08 ***
treat3          -1.276e+03  1.253e+03  -1.018    0.309    
period3          2.390e+04  1.294e+03  18.474  < 2e-16 ***
treatperiod3    -1.077e+03  1.820e+03  -0.592    0.554    
treat4           7.197e+01  1.081e+03   0.067    0.947    
period4          4.651e+04  1.575e+03  29.521  < 2e-16 ***
treatperiod4     1.395e+03  1.886e+03   0.740    0.460    
education        1.871e+05  1.009e+04  18.547  < 2e-16 ***
age             -7.470e+04  1.456e+04  -5.132 3.81e-07 ***
population      -1.279e-01  1.709e-01  -0.748    0.455    
recessiondotcom -7.680e+02  1.500e+03  -0.512    0.609    
recessionGFC    -9.536e+03  1.283e+03  -7.430 3.49e-13 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9980 on 639 degrees of freedom
  (21 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.8705,Adjusted R-squared:  0.8683 
F-statistic: 390.5 on 11 and 639 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16
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